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Internal Coalitional Stability And The Global Externality Game

In: Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements The Ca’ Foscari Lectures

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  • Henry Tulkens

Abstract

The following sections are included:The purpose and the messageAn alternative theory of coalitional stabilityThe “internal and external” stability concepts: An informal presentationInternal coalitional stability in the GEGCoalitional externality and coalitional free ridingThe equilibrium size of the coalitional externality“Outside option payoff” and possible outcomes of negotiationsProperties of an equilibrium with one free riding playerEquilibria with multiple free riding players: ProblemsAn existence issueA chain of contradictory expectationsAnalytical exploration of more general casesNumerical experiments with CWSConcluding considerationsOn the scope of the internal coalitional stability conceptOn achieving cooperation: By surplus grabbing vs. surplus sharing?On internal vs. γ-core stability and efficiency

Suggested Citation

  • Henry Tulkens, 2019. "Internal Coalitional Stability And The Global Externality Game," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Economics, Game Theory and International Environmental Agreements The Ca’ Foscari Lectures, chapter 9, pages 329-354, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:wschap:9789813141230_0009
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    Keywords

    Environmental Economics; Environmental Externalities; Climate Change; Game Theory; γ-core; Dynamic Games; International Agreements; UNFCCC Process; Kyoto Protocol;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General

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