Comparative Analysis of Institutional Incentives and Organisational Adjustment of Social Actors in Eight European Countries

This chapter compares the institutional differences between some European social actors and their implications in the policymaking process. We observe the difference between reinforcement of social pacts or reinforcement of social actors and their results in economic performance. We emphasize the pernicious effects of bargaining systems excessively based on institutional rewards and political rationales as opposed to centralized and coordinated bargaining system. If the roles of social actors in economic policymaking are restricted in exchange for monopoly of representation, that reduces the necessity to recruit new members and ensures access to public resources. In the case study between different countries firstly, we argue that social pacts are often short-sighted compromises with no compulsory clauses concerning policy outcomes. Secondly, we point out that political social pacts draw upon numerous trades off logics between the government and social actors. In this case, thirdly, such a scenario urges social actors to be focused primarily on institutional representation. However, they face serious constraints as far as most of the advisory forums and monitoring institutions remain outside the core of decision-making. The cases of Spain and Italy give the best examples to understand the incapacity to resolve political and economic problems with this instrument.