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A Median Activist Theorem for Two-Stage Spatial Models

In: The Political Economy of Governance

Author

Listed:
  • Daniel M. Kselman

    (IE School of International Relations)

Abstract

The spatial model of electoral competition has for decades been a staple of formal political theory. As part of this field, a number of authors have developed two-stage spatial models in which electoral candidates must first win intra-party primary elections, and then compete in a general inter-party election. A universal result in these two-stage models is that party selectorates, and in particular the “median party activist”, exert a centrifugal pull on party platforms. The current paper brings this basic finding into question, suggesting that party voters only exert this centrifugal force under fairly strict conditions; and in particular only if candidates attach fairly high value to the outcome. The paper’s primary result, a “Median-Activist Theorem”, suggests that if candidates place little value on winning the nomination in and of itself, primaries are necessary, but not sufficient, for generating more extreme electoral platforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel M. Kselman, 2015. "A Median Activist Theorem for Two-Stage Spatial Models," Studies in Political Economy, in: Norman Schofield & Gonzalo Caballero (ed.), The Political Economy of Governance, edition 127, pages 193-210, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stpocp:978-3-319-15551-7_10
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-15551-7_10
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    Cited by:

    1. Bernard Grofman & Orestis Troumpounis & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2016. "Electoral competition with primaries and quality asymmetries," Working Papers 135286117, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.

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