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Agent Type, Social Contracts, and Constitutional Mythologies

In: Constitutional Mythologies

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Boettke

    (George Mason University)

  • Alexander Fink

    (George Mason University)

Abstract

The quest to constrain the power of the state has been ongoing since ancient Athens. And the fundamental paradox of governance has been the same ever since, how can we empower government with the ability to govern over men, but also constrain government so it does not abuse the powers entrusted with it. This is the essence of the argument for limited government, and the Constitutional project. “If all men were angels,” they would not have to be governed, and if we could select omniscient angels for government, the question of “who guards the guardians” would be ­obsolete. Realizing that men are neither perfectly noble nor all-knowing leaves us with the task of constraining those that do the governing. The social contract that defines the rules of the game of governing allows government to limit private ­predation and limit pubic predation by the government only if it is robust against the flaws of the available agent types.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Boettke & Alexander Fink, 2011. "Agent Type, Social Contracts, and Constitutional Mythologies," Studies in Public Choice, in: Alain Marciano (ed.), Constitutional Mythologies, chapter 0, pages 25-37, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-1-4419-6784-8_3
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-6784-8_3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Peter J. Boettke & Christopher J. Coyne & Peter T. Leeson, 2015. "Institutional stickiness and the New Development Economics," Chapters, in: Laura E. Grube & Virgil Henry Storr (ed.), Culture and Economic Action, chapter 6, pages 123-146, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    4. Coyne, Christopher J. & Boettke, Peter J., 2009. "The problem of credible commitment in reconstruction," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1-23, April.
    5. Andrei Shleifer & Daniel Treisman, 2005. "A Normal Country: Russia After Communism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 151-174, Winter.
    6. James M. Buchanan, 2008. "Constitutional Political Economy," Springer Books, in: Readings in Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy, chapter 17, pages 281-293, Springer.
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