Cooperative games with incomplete information
In: Differential Information Economies
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Abstract
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DOI: 10.1007/3-540-26979-7_25
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Other versions of this item:
- Roger B. Myerson, 1982. "Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 528, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Beth Allen, 1996. "Cooperative theory with incomplete information," Staff Report 225, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2002.
"The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1865-1892, September.
- FORGES, Françoise & MERTENS, Jean-François & VOHRA, Rajiv, 2001. "The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2001001, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Francoise Forges & Jean-Francois Mertens & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the absence of wealth effects," Working Papers 2001-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Dionysius Glycopantis & Carlos Hervés-Beloso & Konrad Podczeck, 2009. "Symposium on: equilibria with asymmetric information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(2), pages 217-219, February.
- Jerez, Belen, 2003.
"A dual characterization of incentive efficiency,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 1-34, September.
- Bel? Jerez, 2001. "A Dual Characterization of Incentive Efficiency," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 494.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Beth Allen, 1996. "Implementation theory with incomplete information," Staff Report 226, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
More about this item
Keywords
Incomplete Information; Cooperative Game; Solution Concept; Grand Coalition; Bargaining Solution;All these keywords.
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