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Simulating a Multi-Stage Screening Network: A Queueing Theory and Game Theory Application

In: Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security

Author

Listed:
  • Xiaowen Wang

    (University at Buffalo)

  • Cen Song

    (University at Buffalo)

  • Jun Zhuang

    (University at Buffalo)

Abstract

Simulation is widely used to study model for balancing congestion and security of a screening system. Security network is realistic and used in practice, but it is complex to analyze, especially when facing strategic applicants. To our best knowledge, no previous work has been done on a multi-stage security screening network using game theory and queueing theory. This research fills this gap by using simulation. For multi-stage screening, the method to determine the optimal screening probabilities in each stage is critical. Potential applicants may have access to information such as screening policy and other applicants’ behaviors to adjust their application strategies. We use queueing theory and game theory to study the waiting time and the strategic interactions between the approver and the applicants. Arena simulation software is used to build the screening system with three major components: arrival process, screening process, and departure process. We use Matlab Graphic User Interface (GUI) to collect user inputs, then export data through Excel for Arena simulation, and finally export simulation from the results of the Arena to Matlab for analysis and visualization. This research provides some new insights to security screening problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaowen Wang & Cen Song & Jun Zhuang, 2015. "Simulating a Multi-Stage Screening Network: A Queueing Theory and Game Theory Application," Springer Series in Reliability Engineering, in: Kjell Hausken & Jun Zhuang (ed.), Game Theoretic Analysis of Congestion, Safety and Security, edition 127, pages 55-80, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:ssrchp:978-3-319-13009-5_3
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-13009-5_3
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    Cited by:

    1. Puneet Agarwal & Kyle Hunt & Shivasubramanian Srinivasan & Jun Zhuang, 2020. "Fire Code Inspection and Compliance: A Game-Theoretic Model Between Fire Inspection Agencies and Building Owners," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 17(3), pages 208-226, September.

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