Terrorism and the War on Terrorism

This chapter applies principles of institutional and evolutionary political economy to the historical events and processes underlying the 9/11 attacks on New York and (near) Washington DC in late 2001, and examines policies that should be implemented to moderate the operational consequences of terrorism, as well as the war on terrorism. We start by addressing the principle of historical specificity, by situating the terrorist crisis, defining terrorism and its various types, and scrutinizing the dominant contradictions involved. The principle of contradiction is employed by analyzing four contradictions associated with jihadi terrorism and the war on terrorism. The first contradiction employs the principle of circular and cumulative causation (CCC) to ascertain how such attacks constitute relatively low risks of fatality for specific individuals compared with car accidents, suicide, murder and TB, but also a high apparently system (social) risk/uncertainty which often lead people to become fearful and intimidated in a CCC fashion. The second contradiction utilises the principle of innovation by recognising that the creative destruction of technology can both enhance the human condition as well as, when used by terrorists as a form of sabotage, substantially reduce the quality of life of the community. The third contradiction addresses the principle of hegemony and uneven development through the strategic use of such terrorists (such as the Mujahideen) by the United States to fight the Soviets leading to the emergence of a power vacuum which Al Qaida, the Taliban and other groups used to enhance their strategic ambitions. And the fourth contradiction is that global deregulation and neoliberalism led to greater uneven development throughout the world as well as lax regulations that enhanced the ability of terrorists to form financial and social networks to plan successful attacks on the west. Then I employ the principle of policy and governance by proposing policies relating to each contradiction to deescalate the power of such jihadis. These include public education programs on terrorism, and consequence management on the ground; circuit breakers, supply buffers, microbe attack preparation, and alternative nodes to reduce the extent of technological centralization; the deepening of multilateralism, greater linkages to islamic cultures, and dialogue with islamic powers; a new balance between regulation and freedom to reduce cyber-terrorism, terrorist movement, and terrorist access to finance; plus the promotion of progressive counter-forces such as islamic political economy