IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/sptchp/978-3-662-46950-7_9.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility

In: Game Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Hans Peters

    (Maastricht University)

Abstract

The implicit assumption in a cooperative game is that players can form coalitions and make binding agreements on how to distribute the proceeds of these coalitions. A cooperative game is more abstract than a noncooperative game in the sense that strategies are not explicitly modelled: rather, the game describes what each possible coalition can earn by cooperation. In a cooperative game with transferable utility it is assumed that the earnings of a coalition can be expressed by one number. One may think of this number as an amount of money, which can be distributed among the players in any conceivable way—including negative payments—if the coalition is actually formed. More generally, it is an amount of utility and the implicit assumption is that it makes sense to transfer this utility among the players—for instance, due to the presence of a medium like money, assuming that individual utilities can be expressed in monetary terms.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Peters, 2015. "Cooperative Games with Transferable Utility," Springer Texts in Business and Economics, in: Game Theory, edition 2, chapter 9, pages 151-169, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_9
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_9
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nadim K. M. Madi & Zurina Bt Mohd Hanapi & Mohamed Othman & Shamala Subramaniam, 2017. "Two-level QoS-aware frame-based downlink resources allocation for RT/NRT services fairness in LTE networks," Telecommunication Systems: Modelling, Analysis, Design and Management, Springer, vol. 66(3), pages 357-375, November.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_9. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.