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Two Strategic Issues in Apologizing

In: Games, Groups, and the Global Good

Author

Listed:
  • Barry O’Neill

    (University of California)

Abstract

Social norms are typically embedded in networks of supporting norms that call on other parties to confer punishments or rewards depending on compliance with the original norm. Apologies are “all-purpose” supporting norms since the prospect of having to apologize deters many kinds of transgressions. One puzzle is how a network can avoid an infinite hierarchy of norms. A repeated game model of apologizing shows how a small number can be arranged in loops of mutual support. A second puzzle is why an apology bundles together so many speech acts – it acknowledges that one committed an offense and that it caused risk or harm. It expresses remorse and promises that there will be no repetition. Sometimes the actor is ready to perform only some of these, but recipients typically want full apologies, and there seem to be no single words for the subsets. A possible explanation is that the elements are synergistic. A game model hypothetically reduces an apology to just a promise not to do it again, but those apologizer-types who are less scrupulous about keeping a promise would be more ready to make one, so making a promise is itself grounds for disbelief and in the end none are made. Adding a requirement to show remorse confers credibility and produces an equilibrium that includes promising.

Suggested Citation

  • Barry O’Neill, 2009. "Two Strategic Issues in Apologizing," Springer Series in Game Theory, in: Simon A. Levin (ed.), Games, Groups, and the Global Good, pages 243-257, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-540-85436-4_15
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_15
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