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Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly

In: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games

Author

Listed:
  • Ngo Long

    (McGill University)

Abstract

This paper studies oligopolistic equilibria when not all firms behave in a Nashian fashion. The Kantian firms act according to norms of behavior that reflect the Kantian categorical imperative. We introduce the concepts of Exclusive Kant-Nash Equilibrium and Inclusive Kant-Nash Equilibrium to study such situations. Our model formalises Sen’s conjecture that in actual situations people often do not follow the selfish strategy because of the Kantian norm of behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Ngo Long, 2016. "Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly," Springer Series in Game Theory, in: Pierre von Mouche & Federico Quartieri (ed.), Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games, pages 179-201, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-319-29254-0_12
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_12
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    Cited by:

    1. Sebastian Bervoets & Kohmei Makihara, 2023. "Public Goods in Networks: Comparative Statics Results," AMSE Working Papers 2317, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    2. Murat Donduran & Burak Ünveren, 2021. "A Kantian Analysis of Pricing and R & D," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(4), pages 583-605, June.

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