IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/sprchp/978-981-33-4359-7_58.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Stackelberg Game Model of Power Plants and Large Users Considering Carbon Trading

In: Liss 2020

Author

Listed:
  • Xinyu Niu

    (Beijing Jiaotong University)

  • Shifeng Liu

    (Beijing Jiaotong University)

Abstract

Bilateral transactions are widely used in the power market in the context of power reform and low-carbon power, and more and more users can directly sign bilateral contracts with power plants to purchase power. This paper studies the issue of bilateral transactions between multiple power generators and large users based on the carbon trading background. The power generators first gave a quotation, and the large users then decided the stackelberg game problem of the contract power. The results show that the existence of a Nash equilibrium solution for multiple units quoting at the same time, and an algorithm for determining the contract power of large users and the initial price of units is given. This study of strategic behavior can provide theoretical support for decision-making of power plants and large users, and provide theoretical support for the bilateral negotiation between the unit and large users.

Suggested Citation

  • Xinyu Niu & Shifeng Liu, 2021. "Stackelberg Game Model of Power Plants and Large Users Considering Carbon Trading," Springer Books, in: Shifeng Liu & Gábor Bohács & Xianliang Shi & Xiaopu Shang & Anqiang Huang (ed.), Liss 2020, pages 837-848, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-33-4359-7_58
    DOI: 10.1007/978-981-33-4359-7_58
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-33-4359-7_58. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.