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The Supervision Strategy Based on Evolutionary Game Between Government and Sharing Economy Enterprises of Beijing

In: Liss 2020

Author

Listed:
  • Dandan Li

    (Beijing Union University)

  • Xiaochuan Li

    (Capital University of Economics and Business)

Abstract

In recent years, sharing economy is developing rapidly. The sharing economy enterprises in Beijing have the characteristics of being cross-industry, networked, large in number, and wide-ranging. So they put forward new requirements on the current regulatory model. In this paper, the dynamic evolutionary game model between government and sharing economy enterprises of Beijing is established, and the stability of the game is discussed, in order to provide some supervision strategy for government of Beijing. How to choose the strategy for both government and sharing economy enterprises of Beijing? The model proposed in this paper could not only achieve the encourage innovation, but also could standardized the development of sharing economy enterprises in Beijing. The game evolution results show that the third-party reporting rate, penalties for violations, and the success rate of government supervision have a great influence on the Beijing government's strategic choice. This paper provides the theoretical basis for the strategy selection and policy formulation in the period of sharing economy. At the same time, it could provide some theoretical basis for government of Beijing at governance to sharing economy enterprises, and the developing strategy of enterprises based on government of Beijing.

Suggested Citation

  • Dandan Li & Xiaochuan Li, 2021. "The Supervision Strategy Based on Evolutionary Game Between Government and Sharing Economy Enterprises of Beijing," Springer Books, in: Shifeng Liu & Gábor Bohács & Xianliang Shi & Xiaopu Shang & Anqiang Huang (ed.), Liss 2020, pages 351-360, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-33-4359-7_25
    DOI: 10.1007/978-981-33-4359-7_25
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