Cost of Exclusion, a New Measure of Platform Dominance

This article considers one of the most important manifestations of the development and operation of digital platforms: their dominance in the modern digital market, as well as interaction with users. The analysis of the theoretical understanding of the digital platforms allows the authors to conclude that their dominant position within the market can produce not only attraction but the exclusion of producers and consumers from the platform via issuing relevant norms and restrictions on the platforms’ use. The cost of such exclusion is relevant to the size of the platform. In this regard, the monopolization of leading digital marketplace platforms poses a great problem for the competition authorities. Despite similarities of competition laws, their application can differ significantly. These disagreements may arise for a number of reasons: in particular, due to differences in the priorities and goals of the activities of the antimonopoly authorities, significant differences in interpretation by the courts, and due to various historical, legal, and state theories. The European Union poses one of the brightest examples of these tendencies. After the deep analysis of the EU competition practice, the authors concluded that the European Commission is currently increasingly researching and investigating technology business models and ecosystems, pursuing a consistent policy in regulating the functioning of digital platforms and their interactions with consumers, filling legal gaps, and ensuring a fair and open environment for online platforms, eliminating any manifestations of discrimination and the use of dominant market position.