Author
Abstract
In the course of the Wirecard scandal, banking supervision by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) also came under criticism. This article discusses the applicable legal requirements for regulatory group consolidation, which are the reason why large parts of the Wirecard Group were exempt from BaFin supervision. It also discusses which corporate group structures enable such undermining of banking regulatory oversight. Using real existing group structures of selected German companies, we show empirically that such structures also existed outside the Wirecard Group - and still exist today. In particular, we show that the regulatory scope of consolidation can be strongly influenced by the selected group structure - and especially by the use of so-called ‘blocker companies’. This results in de lege ferenda recommendations. Overall, this article thus contributes to the ongoing legal policy review of the Wirecard case. Im Zuge des Wirecard-Skandals geriet auch die bankaufsichtsrechtliche Überwachung durch die Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) in die Kritik. Dieser Beitrag diskutiert die geltenden Rechtsnormen zur aufsichtsrechtlichen Gruppenkonsolidierung, welche ursächlich dafür sind, dass weite Bereiche der Wirecard-Gruppe der BaFin-Aufsicht entzogen waren. Er erörtert zudem, welche gesellschaftsrechtlichen Konzernstrukturen eine solche Aushöhlung der bankaufsichtsrechtlichen Überwachung ermöglichen. Anhand real existierender Konzernstrukturen ausgewählter deutscher Unternehmen wird empirisch aufgezeigt, dass solche Strukturen auch außerhalb der Wirecard-Gruppe existiert haben und bis heute existieren. Insbesondere zeigt sich, dass der Umfang des aufsichtsrechtlichen Konsolidierungskreises stark durch die gewählte Konzernstruktur – und insbesondere durch den Einsatz sog. Blockergesellschaften – beeinflussbar ist. Daraus ergeben sich de lege ferenda-Empfehlungen. Insgesamt trägt der Beitrag damit zur rechtspolitischen Aufarbeitung des Wirecard-Falls bei.
Suggested Citation
Bernd Geier & Thorsten Sellhorn, 2022.
"Aufsicht über Finanzholding-Gruppen,"
Springer Books, in: Behzad Karami (ed.), Skandalfall Wirecard: Eine wissenschaftlich-fundierte interdisziplinäre Analyse, pages 317-334,
Springer.
Handle:
RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-658-35609-5_10
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-658-35609-5_10
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