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Evolutionary Stability Analysis of Behavior Among Partners Under a Default Punishment Mechanism

In: The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

Author

Listed:
  • Rong Ding

    (South China University of Technology)

  • Yan-ming Sun

    (South China University of Technology)

Abstract

Behavior among the alliance partners can be divided into two kinds of reciprocity and opportunism. Based on evolutionary game theory and methods, it constructs Prisoner’s Dilemma evolutionary game model for behavior selection among partners under a default punishment mechanism, and analyzes the asymptotic stability of the behavioral strategies evolution in different punishment situations. The results show that: When liquidated damages are large enough to compensate for both the net loss of deception in reciprocity and the difference between the temptation earnings and the cooperation gains, it will be unprofitable to take opportunistic behavior, and both the two sides will adopt the win-win strategy of reciprocity behavior as evolutionary stable strategy. Finally, the numerical simulation analysis is taken to verify the correctness of the conclusion. The conclusion can be used as the reference of the cooperation agreement established among the partners.

Suggested Citation

  • Rong Ding & Yan-ming Sun, 2013. "Evolutionary Stability Analysis of Behavior Among Partners Under a Default Punishment Mechanism," Springer Books, in: Ershi Qi & Jiang Shen & Runliang Dou (ed.), The 19th International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, edition 127, chapter 0, pages 587-597, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-37270-4_56
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-37270-4_56
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