Collective Action Is Not Universal

While there are many cases of voluntary efforts to provide mosquito control, such behaviors are not widespread nor are they substantial relative to the role governments have played in providing mosquito control. Advancing the science of collective action related to mosquito control should explain when we observe such cases and when we do not. This chapter suggests voluntary efforts to resolve collective action are less likely when transaction costs are high, when there are easily available alternatives, and when institutions discourage private actors. Transaction costs vary from the costs to identify the source of mosquitos to the costs of writing contracts, but they all deter subsequent efforts to resolve collective action. Substitution is also a relevant factor as collective action becomes less useful as people can more easily avoid mosquitos, for example, through migration or through effective methods of screening. Institutions or rules of the game are also relevant as they can encourage people to cooperate or not. Rules regarding property rights, for example, might encourage the production of mosquito nets and better means of mosquito control. Rules that restrict property rights or that impose taxes, however, tend to discourage such production and can enhance mosquito populations.