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Criteria for Evaluating the Distribution of Powers and Its Compliance

In: International Trade Relations of the European Union

Author

Listed:
  • Rafael Leal-Arcas

    (Alfaisal University, College of Law & International Relations)

Abstract

This chapter provides an evaluation of the division of competences between the European Union and its Member States, using some non-legal criteria, where we shall see how the Member States have delegated their authority to negotiate international trade agreements to the supranational level. The delegation of competences in the EU can be explained through the Principal-Agent theory. This theory has only recently been applied to the context of international trade negotiations. According to this theory, agency costs can be due, inter alia, to information asymmetries. In other words, agents know more about their duties than their principals do. In the context of negotiations, we would speak of agency costs because the negotiator knows more than the principal about the constraints of external negotiations. Often, agency costs also may occur because the agent’s interests may not be the same as those of her or his principals. The challenge is to create institutional arrangements to minimize such agency costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Rafael Leal-Arcas, 2022. "Criteria for Evaluating the Distribution of Powers and Its Compliance," Springer Books, in: International Trade Relations of the European Union, chapter 0, pages 115-127, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-14076-1_6
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-14076-1_6
    as

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