Structures and Decisions in Emerging Market Multinational Corporations

Regional headquarters are in a distinct tension between the mother company, own interests and subsidiaries as they play an intermediary role. Contrary to international business theory, traditionally considering regional units to be not much more than transmission mechanisms to manage complex organizations, research in organization studies hold the opinion that politics in organization is neither avoidable nor negative only. Furthermore, their chances to act sustainably and exist in the long run depend on the distribution of internal control and responsibilities. This article argues that regional units not just execute a general strategic plan, rather, they can be influential themselves, depending on forms of establishment, organizational set-up, regional embedding and particularly on the (power of) respective managers and units. Bargaining processes in strategic, transmission and operational power games potentially contribute to long-term, autonomy enhancing regional settlements, illustrated by two cases of regional headquarters of Latin American multinationals operating in Austria. On the downside, we find low expectations for autonomy in subdivisions of emerging markets multinationals normally described as isolated hierarchies.