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The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain

In: Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain

Author

Listed:
  • Dan S. Felsenthal
  • Hannu Nurmi

    (University of Turku)

Abstract

This chapter focuses on the possibility that some well-known voting procedures lead to specific types of monotonicity paradoxes in preference profiles that are characterized by the presence and election of a Condorcet winner. Moulin’s (Journal of Economic Theory 45:53–64, 1988) theorem establishes the incompatibility of Condorcet-consistency and invulnerability to the No-Show paradox in voting procedures when there are more than three alternatives to be chosen from. We ask whether this conclusion would also hold in the proper subset of profiles distinguished by the property that a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in the initial profile. Our focus is on 20 voting procedures designed to elect a single candidate. These procedures include both Condorcet-consistent and non-consistent rules. The former are, however, only briefly touched upon because their invulnerability to most types of monotonicity violations in the restricted domain is obvious.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan S. Felsenthal & Hannu Nurmi, 2019. "The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain," SpringerBriefs in Economics, in: Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain, chapter 0, pages 17-40, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-030-12627-8_3
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-12627-8_3
    as

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