Recent Evidence on Anti-Dumping Duties as a Tool of Protectionism

The main purpose of the present paper is to quote recent data concerning the use of the anti-dumping mechanism among the member countries of the WTO. We focus on some quality parameters as the frequency of the use of the mechanism on behalf of the WTO members, the differences among acting and targeted countries, the high concentration on specific sectors of industrial activity, the rejection possibility of an initiation and the possible use of the mechanism as a mean of retaliation among neighboring or competing countries. Finally, we examine the correlation between acting and targeted countries with some basic macroeconomic factors. Even though in the post WTO period the number of anti-dumping initiations and measures increased sharply, the anti-dumping mechanism is still utilized only by a limited number of developed or industrial countries and it is disproportionately concentrated in a few industry sectors (Aggarwal Aggarwal A (2008) Anti-dumping protection: who gets it? An exploratory analysis of anti-dumping use in the most active user countries. Working Paper. Copenhagen Business School). Critics support that anti-dumping mechanism is a burrier which protects the domestic industries from import competition and that it is the most often used form of contingent protection, (Tharakan Tharakan PKM (2000) The problem of Anti-dumping protection and developing country exports. The U.N. University, WIDER, Working Paper No 198). The international literature also suggest that trade policy is inevitable designed to protect domestic industries. Although trade protectionism has never been dissipated in the past decades, the forms of trade protection are showing new trend and characteristics and are becoming increasingly subtle and diversified, (Prusa Prusa TJ (1997) Trade effects of U.S. antidumping actions. National Bureau of Economic Research. working paper 5540, Prusa TJ (2021) The trade effects of US antidumping actions. In Economic Effects of Antidumping (pp. 21–43); Prusa and Skeath Prusa TJ, Skeath S (2001) The economic and strategic motives for antidumping filings. NBER Working Paper no 8424). Under this notion anti-dumping mechanism has gradually become a tool of protection for the domestic industries against competition posed by imports, (Bloningen and Bown Bloningen and Bown, J Intern Eco 60:249–273, 2001). There is evidence that anti-dumping duties often have nothing to do with protecting the competition and only high-level economies can initiate a procedure in a regular basis, (Finger et al. Finger MJ, Ng F, Wanhchuk S (2001) Anti-dumping as Safeguard Policy. Policy Research working paper Series 2730. The World Bank). Most findings supported by the researchers are based on statistical data concerning at most the first 10 years after the WTO establishment. We focus on resent data covering the post WTO period until 2021 to give further support to the topics mentioned above. All country members are obligated to submit in a regular basis data about the use of this mechanism. These data are available in WTO’s database in a year-by-year basis for all member counties and offers an opportunity for a wide range of statistical analysis. Furthermore, we examine the correlation of the initiations and measure with some macroeconomic factors that are of decisive importance for the use of the mechanism. It is concluded that, resent quantitative data, offer further support to empirical evidence mentioned above, regarding the use of anti-dumping as a tool of protectionism. Firstly, it is confirmed that there is high concentration among developed and industrial countries and secondly, as for the sectoral distribution we observe that there is a high concentration in a few industrial sectors. Also, we assume that neighboring and competitive countries are targeted mutually, as a form of retaliation. Finally, the result of the statistical analysis suggests strong correlation between Merchandise Exports and the frequent use of the Anti-dumping mechanism.