IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/oprchp/978-3-540-69995-8_7.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Complexity of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Games

In: Operations Research Proceedings 2006

Author

Listed:
  • Juliane Dunke

    (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Abstract

Game theory in general and the concept of Nash equilibrium in particular have lately come under increased scrutiny by theoretical computer scientists. Computing a mixed Nash equilibrium is a case in point. For many years, one of the most important open problems was the complexity of computing a mixed Nash equilibrium in games with only two players. Only recently was it solved by a sequence of significant papers (Goldberg and Papadimitriou (2006), Daskalakis et.al. (2006), Chen and Deng (2005), Daskalakis and Papadimitriou (2005), and Chen and Deng (2006)).

Suggested Citation

  • Juliane Dunke, 2007. "Complexity of Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria in Non-Cooperative Games," Operations Research Proceedings, in: Karl-Heinz Waldmann & Ulrike M. Stocker (ed.), Operations Research Proceedings 2006, pages 45-51, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-540-69995-8_7
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-69995-8_7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-540-69995-8_7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.