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Simulation of Bribes and Consequences of Leniency Policy. Results from an Experimental Study

In: Operations Research Proceedings 2012

Author

Listed:
  • Alexandra Christöfl
  • Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger

    (Universitätsstraße 15)

  • Arleta Rasmußen

    (Universitätsstraße 15)

Abstract

Within the context of the present work an experimental study is conducted which executes negotiations between the agent and bidders. In these contract awards the opportunity for bribes is simulated. The following issues are analyzed: on the one hand the willingness to be dishonest respectively to accept bribes and on the other hand the effect of different detection probabilities and the possibility of leniency policy. The new idea is the simulation of bribes and as a further step the consequences of leniency policy. Our motivation was created by recent developments of increasing cases of corruption worldwide. Quite a number of corruption cases are in the field of huge projects mainly in construction industry, building sector in general and energy sector and of course in all sorts of supplies of services. We ran an experiment and report some interesting results.

Suggested Citation

  • Alexandra Christöfl & Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger & Arleta Rasmußen, 2014. "Simulation of Bribes and Consequences of Leniency Policy. Results from an Experimental Study," Operations Research Proceedings, in: Stefan Helber & Michael Breitner & Daniel Rösch & Cornelia Schön & Johann-Matthias Graf von der Schu (ed.), Operations Research Proceedings 2012, edition 127, pages 211-216, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:oprchp:978-3-319-00795-3_31
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-00795-3_31
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexandra Christöfl & Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger & Arleta Rasmußen, 2017. "An experimental study on bribes, detection probability and principal witness policy," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 87(8), pages 1067-1081, November.

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