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Incentives and the Search for Unknown Resources Such as Water

In: Frontiers in Water Resource Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Jean-Jacques Laffont

    (Université Toulouse and CNRS
    University of Southern California)

  • François Salanié

    (Université Toulouse (INRA & LERNA))

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Jacques Laffont & François Salanié, 2006. "Incentives and the Search for Unknown Resources Such as Water," Natural Resource Management and Policy, in: Renan-Ulrich Goetz & Dolors Berga (ed.), Frontiers in Water Resource Economics, chapter 0, pages 21-41, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:nrmchp:978-0-387-30056-6_2
    DOI: 10.1007/0-387-30056-2_2
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andrew Postlewaite, 1979. "Manipulation via Endowments," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 255-262.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July.
    4. Bull, Jesse & Watson, Joel, 2004. "Evidence disclosure and verifiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 1-31, September.
    5. Jerry R. Green & Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1986. "Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 53(3), pages 447-456.
    6. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December.
    8. Maggi G. & Rodriguez-Clare A., 1995. "On Countervailing Incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-263, June.
    9. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
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