IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/lnopch/978-3-031-24907-5_73.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

GTRF: Generalized Trade Reduction Framework for Double-Auction Mechanisms

In: Operations Research Proceedings 2022

Author

Listed:
  • Jacob Ehrlich

    (Universität der Bundeswehr München)

  • Maximilian Moll

    (Universität der Bundeswehr München)

  • Stefan Pickl

    (Universität der Bundeswehr München)

Abstract

In a groundbreaking paper McAfee introduced the Trade Reduction (TR) Mechanism that circumvents the famous Myerson and Satterthwaite impossibility result by sacrificing a small amount of efficiency. Here the author creates order statistics based on the submitted bids and reduces at most the least efficient trade. Based on this principle an alternate mechanism was proposed by Segal-Halevi et al. which extends this to the strongly budget balanced setting. This paper proposes a generalization of these two TR mechanisms to fit into a larger framework that can be implemented based on the market in which the auction is to be applied. Additionally, by taking advantage of the relationship of bid order-statistics a novel mechanism; titled BORS, is revealed to complete the GTRF. Using a simulation based evaluation, performance is characterized across various settings in order to achieve optimized results.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacob Ehrlich & Maximilian Moll & Stefan Pickl, 2023. "GTRF: Generalized Trade Reduction Framework for Double-Auction Mechanisms," Lecture Notes in Operations Research, in: Oliver Grothe & Stefan Nickel & Steffen Rebennack & Oliver Stein (ed.), Operations Research Proceedings 2022, chapter 0, pages 611-616, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:lnopch:978-3-031-24907-5_73
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-24907-5_73
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions/competitive bidding; Simulation;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:lnopch:978-3-031-24907-5_73. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.