Conclusion and Outlook

The research objective of the underlying thesis is to improve existing approaches of supply chain coordination under asymmetric information. Section 2.1 gave a brief and general introduction into principal–agent models under asymmetric information. These models were classified into moral hazard and adverse selection problem. Afterwards, one approach to solve adverse selection problems, namely screening contracts, was discussed in a strategic lotsizing framework. One of the main assumptions in this framework is that the privately informed agent uses his superior information strategically. The principal, in turn, anticipates this strategic use and offers a screening contract which is independent of any communication between the principal and the agent. Yet, these screening contracts are inefficient, and recent experimental research has shown that the assumptions of rational- and fully opportunistic behavior have to be treated with caution. Hence, Sect. 2.3 analyzes the potential benefits and pitfalls of information sharing in case of (non rational) trust and trustworthiness. Finally, Sect. 2.4 closes with a comprehensive review of adverse selection models in supply chain management.