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The Mixed Effect of Voluntary Revelation: Evidence from Threshold Public Goods Game Experiments

In: Developments on Experimental Economics

Author

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  • Yasuyo Hamaguchi

    (Nagoya City University)

Abstract

A number of experimental studies on public goods have shown that many people prefer to cooperate with others in the beginning, but this tendency diminishes as they interact with others in the course of the experiments (e.g. Andreoni [1]). Most experimental works on public goods games have so far tried to eliminate social interaction among subjects as much as possible. The purpose of such artificial procedures is to observe people’s selfish motivation uncontaminated by social norms. However, this sort of approach might be misleading if one wants to understand how people successfully produce or maintain a public good in reality.

Suggested Citation

  • Yasuyo Hamaguchi, 2007. "The Mixed Effect of Voluntary Revelation: Evidence from Threshold Public Goods Game Experiments," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, in: Sobei Hidenori Oda (ed.), Developments on Experimental Economics, pages 163-167, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-540-68660-6_14
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-68660-6_14
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    Cited by:

    1. Bose, Bijetri & Rabotyagov, Sergey, 2018. "Provision of public goods using a combination of lottery and a provision point," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 99-115.

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