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Dynamic Coordination of Multiple Agents in a Class of Differential Games Through a Generalized Linear Reward Scheme

In: Models and Methods in Economics and Management Science

Author

Listed:
  • Boaz Golany

    (Faculty of Industrial Engineering and Management)

  • Konstantin Kogan

    (Bar Ilan University)

  • Charles S. Tapiero

    (Polytechnic Institute of New York University)

Abstract

We consider a wide class of dynamic problems characterized by multiple, non-cooperative agents operating under a general control rule. Since each agent follows its own objective function and these functions are interdependent, control efforts made by each agent may affect the performance of the other agents and thus affect the overall performance of the system. We show that recently developed dynamic linear reward/penalty schemes can be generalized to provide coordination of the multiple agents in a broad-spectrum dynamic environment. When the reward scheme is applied, the agents are induced to choose the system-wide optimal solution even though they operate in a decentralized decision-making environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Boaz Golany & Konstantin Kogan & Charles S. Tapiero, 2014. "Dynamic Coordination of Multiple Agents in a Class of Differential Games Through a Generalized Linear Reward Scheme," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Fouad El Ouardighi & Konstantin Kogan (ed.), Models and Methods in Economics and Management Science, edition 127, pages 183-201, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:isochp:978-3-319-00669-7_10
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-00669-7_10
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