The Myth of the Framework and the Modes of Thought in Economics

In this chapter I deal with the impact of the historical epistemology of the styles of scientific reasoning on the analysis of communication breakdowns. To this aim I will make reference to the famous debate between Popper and Kuhn on the occasion of a symposium held in London in 1965. Popper saw in Kuhn’s early investigations on paradigms and incommensurability an example of what he labeled the “myth of the framework”, that is to say, “the belief that it is impossible for the investigators to shortly come out of the framework of concepts and principles within which they are working, and compare it with other competing frameworks”. In my opinion, the issue of the “myth of the framework” can help us clarify some basic assumptions underpinning the historical epistemology of the styles of scientific reasoning as well as its relevance for a theory of communication. In this regard, I will argue that the epistemological explanation of communication breakdowns implies a framework-based relativistic understanding of the styles of reasoning, while the taxonomies of styles presuppose a non-framework-based transcendental understanding of the styles of reasoning. On these grounds, I will suggest a revision of Dow’s theory of modes of thought in economics as well as of the ensuing polemics concerning methodological pluralism in ecological economics. All of this is meant to prepare the ground for the next chapter, in which I will articulate the proposal of a historical epistemology of styles of economic reasoning in relation to the history of ecological economics.