The Political Economy of Electricity Sector Regulation in Africa: A Comparative Analysis

In decades past, developing countries undertook significant power sector reforms with the intention to promote private investment, expand access, increase competition, and promote efficiency in service delivery. The reforms have involved institutional and policy changes, including the creation of independent regulatory bodies to demonstrate political and legal commitment to ending self-regulation and the state-dominated provision of electricity services. However, the extent to which these reforms have yielded the expected benefits remains heavily contested. Some studies have attributed the failure of the reforms to bad design, erratic regulations, and political interference. To further an understanding of these issues, the paper conducted a comparative analysis of power sector reforms across Africa with the view of establishing lessons for future and ongoing reform actions. The chapter utilized the adapted regulation evaluation framework by Kapika & Eberhard (2013) based on Brown et al. (2006). The assessment of regulatory reforms in each country covered regulatory governance, regulatory substance, and regulatory impact. Additionally, the chapter, on the basis of available literature and evidence, attempted to establish the extent to which stakeholder influences have helped to impair or advance the course of regulatory reforms in the electricity sector in Africa. The analysis involved 10 countries, that are a mix of countries with high and low access rates in the sub-region, which is necessary to ensure diversity and a fair representation of regulatory experiences in the region. The study concludes that the establishment of regulatory authorities alone does not translate into regulatory impact on the country. For countries to materialize their regulatory impact, there is the need to ensure political commitment to allow the system to operate to its strength.