Conclusions

Gorbachev’s early speeches and writings on the problems of the Soviet economy provide a litany of familiar complaints and in many respects are a repetition of much that had been said before by his three immediate predecessors (Pravda, 12 March 1985, p. 3 and 17 March 1985, p. 1). Nevertheless, the western press response to his accession to power has been to stress continually both the necessity for reform and the possibilities for reform presented by a new leader (Economist, 26 July–1 August 1986, pp. 9–10; 6 September–12 September 1986, p. 10). Given that Gorbachev is neither a geriatric nor seriously ill, in stark contrast to Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko before him, a longer tenure of the post of General Secretary may well be envisaged, with a longer-term perspective on the problems and potential solutions. However, the possibilities for reform must be tempered by a realistic appraisal of past attempts at reform. I would argue that past leaders have been just as intent on change, and to ascribe the failure of previous reform to the character or personality of past leaders is obviously misleading. This concluding chapter will first provide an outline of Gorbachev’s emerging economic programme before attempting some general conclusions.