Safe to Fail
In: Safe to Fail
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Abstract
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DOI: 10.1057/9781137383655_5
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Thomas F. Huertas, 2014. "Resolution Reform," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 13(4), pages 86-99.
- Faia, Ester & Weder di Mauro, Beatrice, 2015.
"Cross-border resolution of global banks,"
SAFE Working Paper Series
88, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
- Ester Faia & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, 2015. "Cross-border resolution of global banks," Globalization Institute Working Papers 236, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
- Ester Faia & Beatrice Weder di Mauro, 2015. "Cross-Border Resolution of Global Banks," European Economy - Discussion Papers 011, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
- Haselmann, Rainer & Krahnen, Jan Pieter & Wahrenburg, Mark, 2019. "Evaluierung gesamt- und finanzwirtschaftlicher Effekte der Reformen europäischer Finanzmarktregulierung im deutschen Finanzsektor seit der Finanzkrise: Zusammenfassung der wichtigsten Ergebnisse," SAFE Policy Reports 2, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
- Huertas, Thomas F., 2021. "Reset required: The euro area crisis management and deposit insurance framework," SAFE White Paper Series 85, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
- Toma Sorin-George & Gradinaru Catalin, 2018. "Too Big To Fail Banks In The Age Of Globalization," Annals - Economy Series, Constantin Brancusi University, Faculty of Economics, vol. 0, pages 131-136, December.
- Weder di Mauro, Beatrice & Faia, Ester, 2016. "Cross-Border Resolution of Global Banks: Bail in under Single Point of Entry versus Multiple Points of Entry," CEPR Discussion Papers 11171, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Keywords
Central Bank; Home Country; Subordinate Debt; Resolution Regime; Liquidity Provider;All these keywords.
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