From the Eurozone to National Economic Self-Governance

Participation in further EU integration will place a continued straight-jacket upon EU member states’ macroeconomic policy and thus increase the difficulty of their pursuing their national interest. For example, the model for the eurozone seeks to impose a particular institutional frame-work that restricts the flexibility of action of individual countries in order to enable economic policy to be determined, or at least co-ordinated, from the centre. Many economists (Jamieson, 1998; Michie, 2000; Minford, 2000; Ormerod, 1999) argue that greater autonomy for individual nation states, under the principle of subsidiarity, might provide a more stable economic environment in which to pursue further co-operation between countries. However, largely due to the political desire to tie members more closely together, the EU is seeking to progressively replace economic autonomy for a nation state by the requirement to coordinate its economic strategy with the EU norm or else be subject to sanctions levied by the EU Commission (Pennant-Rea et al., 1997). A decision to reject such developments would restore to national government those economic instruments essential to the management of its economy. Governments would be able to devise different economic programmes and, once endorsed by the electorate, would possess the means by which to pursue their chosen objectives. Democracy would, therefore, be restored, so that citizens can once again enjoy the opportunity to choose the economic strategy pursued by the government of the day.