European State Formation and its Impact on Associational Governance: Will Business Interest Association (BIA) Systems become Centralised at the EU Level?

Organised private interests have often been seen as threats to the common good, particularly in the US. James Madison, one of the founders of the American state, talked already of the ‘mischiefs of faction’. Ever since, American economic and political science literature has abounded with descriptions, analyses and criticism of the private abuse of public power. The choir of critics has been politically diverse, from Marxists (Baran and Sweezy, 1968) to liberals sociologists (Wright Mills, 1956; Domhoff, 1967, 1970), political scientists (Schattschneider, 1962; Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Shonfield, 1982; Chubb, 1983), ‘capture’ theorists (Bernstein, 1955; Mitnick, 1980) to conservative representatives of public choice theory (Buchanan et al., 1980; Olson, 1982) and the economic theory of regulation (Stigler, 1971; Posner, 1974). The common thrust of these approaches has been to view economic interest associations are rent seekers, and any influence of them on public policy tends to pervert such policy. They abuse public authority for their own particularistic interests at the expense of the common good. Rather than a democratic state there is a capitalist state, a trade union state, an automobile association state, or a corporatist state, depending on ones political prejudices. At the very best, the influence of opposing particularistic interests may offset each other, allowing public authorities to follow their own course, serving the public interest.