Contextual Psychology (1): Intentional Behaviorism

Although Dennett refers often to behavior as that which is to be explained, he does not incorporate an extensional behavioral science into his scheme of explanation to counterbalance the extensional neurology on which he (at least originally) relies. Yet behavior is the criterion of the intentional and needs to be systematically related to its causal environment in order that it may play its vital role in the framework of analysis proposed here. Nor does the intentional strategy provide other than outline information on the attributions that are to be made in order to predict an intentional system. To say that these attributions consist in the beliefs and desires it “ought” to have is of itself little more than an abstract formula. Yet, the heterophenomenological device that Dennett (1982, 1991b) proposes invites a careful scrutiny of the system’s prior behavior, applying the intentional stance to people’s verbal behavior, treating it as a text to be interpreted in terms of their beliefs and desires. Much as one examines the text of a character in a novel in terms of what he or she says, what they do and what others say of them, plus background information about the author and his or her other writings, so one can produce an intersubjective account of the text provided by another person.