Union Organising in the US: New Tactics, Old Barriers

A 2005 survey by Peter D. Hart Research Associates (2005: 6) showed that 53% of non-managerial employees in the US would, or probably would, vote for union representation at their workplace. This figure was up from 39% in 1996 and 30% in 1984 (Harcourt and Lam 2007: 334). This suggests support for unions has risen in the US over the past two decades. As Robinson (2008: 238) argued, the pressures of a quarter-century of ‘neoliberal restructuring’ have moved more workers to view unions positively. Yet, union membership and density declined over these years, leaving more and more workers without union protection. This decline is most dramatic in the private sector, where losses account for almost twice the net decline since 1970. What is to explain this ‘representation gap’? Despite much rhetoric about accelerated organising, new approaches such as ‘neutrality’ and card-check agreements, and large amounts of financial resources shifted from ‘servicing’ to organising, the results have been too meagre to reverse the downward trend. Using academic, union, and government sources, this chapter will examine the course of this decline, the shift in organising efforts from state-sponsored elections under the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to voluntary ‘neutrality’ and card-check agreements, the extent and effectiveness of these new approaches, and the internal barriers to more rapid growth embedded in the American business union model.