International Co-operation and Global Justice

Many of the problems in the international relations of interdependence arise from a combination of the free rider problem, Olson’s problem,1 and the prisoners’ dilemma. Indeed, the free rider, or contributor’s, dilemma is a special case of the prisoners’ dilemma. The free rider problem exists because some of the solutions of international difficulties consist in the provision of public goods (Kindleberger, 1978, p. 15 and 1986). A public good is one from the supply of which all those who value the good derive some benefit, irrespective of whether they have contributed to its costs. The concept can readily be extended to cover common goals or common interests, the achievement of which benefits all, irrespective of whether they have contributed to the costs of achieving these goals or interests. The enjoyment of the good or service by one person does not detract from the enjoyment by others. In this sense international co-operation and the prevention of international wars are public goods. So are markets and a working international monetary order, with an international central bank as a lender of last resort and as a provider of liquidity. Scientific research is of this kind. An international income tax or the co-ordination of international fixed investment decisions fall under the same heading.