IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/ibg/chaptr/srbeu-7.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Credibility and Monetary Policy: The Case of Serbia

In: Serbia and the European Union: Economic Lessons from the New Member States

Author

Listed:
  • Gradimir Kozetinac

Abstract

The efforts made by Serbia and other transition economies to control inflation led their central banks to pay close attention to the credibility of their monetary policy, particularly during the last decade. The monetary policy credibility in Serbia has always been a matter of discussion. One of the main indicators of the lack of credibility in Serbia’s monetary policy is a high level of foreign currency deposits in the M3 monetary aggregate caused by high eurization level. The lack of trust by the public in the national currency and its exchange rate is reflected in the large proportion of foreign deposits in the sum of demand deposits and savings and time deposits. Furthermore, the process of indexation of transactions to foreign currency (primarily the euro) is still evident. As the result, the national currency has merely the function of the means of payment and conducting transactions, but lacks the functions of measuring value, saving and crediting. This article considers the concept of credibility from both the theoretical and practical viewpoint. The advantages of high credibility are discussed, with a particular focus on Serbia’s experience with explicit inflation-control targets, and measures taken by the National Bank of Serbia to enhance the credibility of its monetary policy are explained.

Suggested Citation

  • Gradimir Kozetinac, 2011. "Credibility and Monetary Policy: The Case of Serbia," Book Chapters, in: Mirjana Radovic Markovic & Srdjan Redzepagic & João Sousa Andrade & Paulino Teixeira (ed.), Serbia and the European Union: Economic Lessons from the New Member States, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 105-117, Institute of Economic Sciences.
    • Handle: RePEc:ibg:chaptr:srbeu-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ien.bg.ac.rs/images/stories/download/serbiaeu_ch7.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Allan Drazen & Paul R. Masson, 1994. "Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(3), pages 735-754.
    2. Blackburn, Keith & Christensen, Michael, 1989. "Monetary Policy and Policy Credibility: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 1-45, March.
    3. Siklos,Pierre L., 2006. "The Changing Face of Central Banking," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521034494, November.
    4. van der Cruijsen, Carin & Demertzis, Maria, 2007. "The impact of central bank transparency on inflation expectations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 51-66, March.
    5. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bryan Chapple, 2006. "Monetary policy strategies and credibility - theory and practice," DNB Occasional Studies 404, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    2. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency : A Survey," Discussion Paper 2007-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Nada Azmy ElBerry & Stijn Goeminne, 2021. "Fiscal transparency, fiscal forecasting and budget credibility in developing countries," Journal of Forecasting, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 40(1), pages 144-161, January.
    4. Loewy, Michael B., 1995. "Equilibrium policy with dynamically naive agents," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 319-331.
    5. Berlemann, Michael & Hilscher, Kai, 2010. "Effective monetary policy conservatism: A comparison of 11 OECD countries," HWWI Research Papers 2-21, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI).
    6. Berlemann, Michael & Hielscher, Kai, 2009. "Measuring Effective Monetary Policy Conservatism," Working Paper 89/2009, Helmut Schmidt University, Hamburg.
    7. Donato Masciandaro, 1995. "Designing a central bank: Social player, monetary agent, or banking agent?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 6(4), pages 399-410, October.
    8. Frank A.G. den Butter & Mathieu L.L. Segers, 2014. "Prospects for an EMU between Federalism and Nationalism," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-008/VI, Tinbergen Institute.
    9. Yıldırım-Karaman, Secil, 2017. "Uncertainty shocks, central bank characteristics and business cycles," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 379-388.
    10. Schaumburg, Ernst & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2007. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 302-324, March.
    11. Akhand Akhtar Hossain, 2009. "Central Banking and Monetary Policy in the Asia-Pacific," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12777.
    12. Demosthenes N. Tambakis, 2007. "Fear of Floating and Social Welfare," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(3), pages 183-204, September.
    13. Hamza Bennani, 2018. "Media Perception of Fed Chair's Overconfidence and Market Expectations," EconomiX Working Papers 2018-29, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    14. Marc Quintyn, 2009. "Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 267-295, September.
    15. Pompeo Della Posta & Mario Morroni, 2022. "The credibility of monetary policy and the fiscal response to the pandemic in the Eurozone," Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 77-96, April.
    16. Henrik Jensen, 1992. "Time inconsistency problems and commitments of monetary and fiscal policies," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 247-266, October.
    17. Myriam Quispe-Agnoli, 2003. "Stabilization programs and policy credibility: Peru in the 1990s," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2003-40, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    18. repec:got:cegedp:40 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Patricia Bonini, 2004. "New Macroeconomics and Credibility Analysis," Economia, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics], vol. 5(2), pages 341-359.
    20. Gabriel Caldas Montes & Júlio Cesar Albuquerque Bastos, 2013. "Economic policies, macroeconomic environment and entrepreneurs' expectations," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 40(3), pages 334-354, July.
    21. KARFAKIS Costas & SIDIROPOULOS Moïse & TRABELSI Jamel, 2010. "Testing for the Borrowed Credibility Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence from the French Disinflation Strategy," EcoMod2003 330700078, EcoMod.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ibg:chaptr:srbeu-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Zorica Bozic (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ienbgyu.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.