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Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests

In: The Political Economy of Antitrust

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  • Cécile Aubert

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  • Cécile Aubert, 2007. "Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests," Contributions to Economic Analysis, in: The Political Economy of Antitrust, pages 123-148, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:ceazzz:s0573-8555(06)82005-5
    DOI: 10.1016/S0573-8555(06)82005-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Cécile Aubert, 2008. "Managerial effort incentives and market collusion," Post-Print hal-00382224, HAL.
    2. Ghosal, Vivek, 2006. "Discovering Cartels: Dynamic Interrelationships between Civil and Criminal Antitrust Investigations," MPRA Paper 5499, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Daniel Herold, 2017. "The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime," MAGKS Papers on Economics 201752, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    4. Ghosal Vivek, 2011. "The Law and Economics of Enhancing Cartel Enforcement: Using Information From Non-Cartel Investigations to Prosecute Cartels," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 501-538, December.

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