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Banking Regulation and Knowledge Problems

In: Studies in Austrian Macroeconomics

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  • Thomas L. Hogan
  • G. P. Manish

Abstract

The Federal Reserve regulates U.S. commercial banks using a system of risk-based capital (RBC) regulations based on the Basel Accords. Unfortunately, the Fed’s mis-rating of several assets such as mortgage-backed securities encouraged the build-up of these assets in the banking system and was a major contributing factor to the 2008 financial crisis. The Basel system of RBC regulation is a prime example of a Hayekian knowledge problem. The contextual, tacit, and subjective knowledge required to properly assess asset risk cannot be aggregated and utilized by regulators. An effective system of banking regulation must acknowledge man’s limited knowledge and place greater value on individual decisions than on top-down planning.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas L. Hogan & G. P. Manish, 2016. "Banking Regulation and Knowledge Problems," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: Studies in Austrian Macroeconomics, volume 20, pages 213-234, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:aaeczz:s1529-213420160000020010
    DOI: 10.1108/S1529-213420160000020010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas L. Hogan, 2021. "A Review of the Regulatory Impact Analysis of Risk-Based Capital and Related Liquidity Rules," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-29, January.
    2. Thomas L. Hogan & Neil R. Meredith & Xuhao (Harry) Pan, 2018. "Evaluating risk‐based capital regulation," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 36(2), pages 83-96, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federal Reserve; Basel Accord; risk-based capital; knowledge problem; G18; E58; P50;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • P50 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General

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