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If Government is so Villainous, How Come Government Officials Don’t Seem Like Villains? With a New Postscript

In: The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy

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  • Daniel B. Klein

Abstract

Individuals tend to seek out communities and organizations that appeal to their beliefs and values. They gravitate to positions and responsibilities that suit their personal aspirations and ambitions, and in such pursuits they succeed best. InThe United States of Ambition: Politicians, Power, and the Pursuit of Office,Alan Ehrenhalt (1992)argues that the political process tends to select for those who most believe in it and make a career of it. He suggests that one advantage held by the Democratic party (over the Republican party) is that the Democratic party is more thoroughly a party of active government, so it better attracts “people who think running for office is worth the considerable sacrifice it entails” (p. 224). Not only does the political process tend to attract those who believe in it, it also tends to prosper believers.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel B. Klein, 2004. "If Government is so Villainous, How Come Government Officials Don’t Seem Like Villains? With a New Postscript," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy, pages 223-244, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:aaeczz:s1529-2134(05)08009-9
    DOI: 10.1016/S1529-2134(05)08009-9
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