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Bargaining for Bribes: The Role of Institutions

In: International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption

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  • Ray Fisman
  • Roberta Gatti

Abstract

Economic research on corruption aims both to isolate the economic effects of quid pro quo deals between agents and third parties, and to suggest how legal and institutional reforms might curb harms and enhance benefits. In this comprehensive Handbook, top scholars in the field provide specially commissioned essays, both theoretical and empirical, exploring both types of research.

Suggested Citation

  • Ray Fisman & Roberta Gatti, 2006. "Bargaining for Bribes: The Role of Institutions," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:3740_4
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Keefer, Philip, 2001. "When do special interests run rampant ? disentangling the role in banking crises of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2543, The World Bank.
    2. Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230.
    3. Juan C. Botero & Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "The Regulation of Labor," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(4), pages 1339-1382.
    4. Kaufman, Daniel & Shang-Jin Wei, 1999. "Does"grease money"speed up the wheels of commerce?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2254, The World Bank.
    5. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
    6. Cadot, Olivier, 1987. "Corruption as a gamble," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 223-244, July.
    7. Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
    8. World Bank, 2004. "World Development Indicators 2004," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13890.
    9. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    10. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere, 1993. "Efficient Sequential Bargaining," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 60(2), pages 435-461.
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