International legal accountability in the CIA war on terror

This chapter focuses on state accountability for wrongful acts resulting from intelligence activities in the CIA-led rendition, detention, and interrogation programme. The case-study aims to identify the factors determining whether a state will be held accountable for wrongful acts resulting from intelligence activities. For this purpose, I analyse the accountability of five states selected as typical cases on a dual comparative scale: the United States, Djibouti, Poland, the Gambia, and the United Kingdom. The case-study highlights that the mere possibility of accountability is often insufficient to achieve accountability in practice, and there is no guarantee that such accountability will be effective in inducing compliance. Further, while a correlation exists between the theoretical potential of a network and actual accountability, the theoretical potential of the network represents the upper limit of what regulation can achieve through accountability. A strong network of accountability mechanisms thus represents an advantage in achieving accountability, but extra-legal factors influencing state behaviour must also be taken into account for accountability to be effective in inducing compliance.