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Mixed-member systems, corruption, and accountability: evidence from Taiwan

In: Handbook on Gender and Corruption in Democracies

Author

Listed:
  • Jingwen Wu
  • Tiffany D. Barnes
  • Nathan Batto
  • Emily Beaulieu

Abstract

Are citizens more likely to punish women politicians for corruption than men? Previous studies have shown that women politicians are held to higher standards than men. Gender stereotypes hold that women should exhibit traits such as honesty, compassion, and moral purity, and thus, are less likely than men to engage in corruption. When women violate these gendered expectations and are implicated in corruption scandals, it could lead to harsher backlash at the polls-above and beyond the response elicited by male politicians who were initially held to lower or different standards. Such studies are consistent with the outcomes of high-profile scandals such as the impeachments of presidents Park Guen-hye in South Korea, and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil. However, this argument assumes that expectations and stereotypes of women are relatively constant across cultures, and that institutional differences will not affect voters’ propensity to punish women any more than men. We investigate this question in the unique cultural and historical context of Taiwan, arguing that institutional differences and cultural context may condition voters’ desire to punish corruption at the polls, providing important insights into the impact of gender on voter accountability.

Suggested Citation

  • Jingwen Wu & Tiffany D. Barnes & Nathan Batto & Emily Beaulieu, 2024. "Mixed-member systems, corruption, and accountability: evidence from Taiwan," Chapters, in: Tiffany D. Barnes & Emily Beaulieu (ed.), Handbook on Gender and Corruption in Democracies, chapter 24, pages 305-317, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:21563_24
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    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/doi/10.4337/9781803923246.00034
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