Heuristics for metascience: Simon and Popper

Herbert Simon had a knack for formal models, but also managed to see them for what they are in science - tools for supporting theoretical development that must be grounded empirically. The first contribution of this chapter is to show how Simon’s formal, grounded models apply to metascience, that is, the scientific study of science. Examining Simon’s ideas on two pillars of metascience, discovery and justification, we find that they contrast with those of a giant of the field, Karl Popper. We argue that the contrasts can be traced to the distinction between logical and ecological rationality. The second contribution of the chapter is to uncover a common component in Simon’s ideas for discovery and justification: heuristics. Heuristics are tools for decision making and problem solving that match specific contexts; that is, they are ecologically rational tools. Along the way, we also go beyond some of Simon’s ideas, such as data-fitting heuristics for discovery, and discuss heuristics in the form of simple, actionable principles guiding discovery. But we would not have been able to carry on Simon’s ideas further without him having first articulated his extraordinary thinking.