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Behavioural economics of morality and sustainability

In: Handbook of Research Methods in Behavioural Economics

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  • Shinji Teraji

Abstract

Conventional economics has argued that people only cooperate for fear of external constraints such as punishments. Following this view, common-pool resources could be sustainably governed with external, economic incentives. However, people exhibit pro-social behaviour when they do not always make choices only based on external incentives. Extrinsic monetary rewards to encourage pro-social behaviour can sometimes crowd out intrinsic motivation to act pro-socially. While economic incentives can manipulate people into being more selfish, social incentives will give prominence to the role of non-pecuniary drivers of pro-social behaviour. This chapter discusses the issue of governing the commons with social incentives. Individuals who consider resource conservation to be a major concern are driven by social incentives. Besides material payoff, agents with pro-environmental preferences obtain psychological payoff related to resource conservation. A society can be sustainable to the degree that its members embody such social preferences.

Suggested Citation

  • Shinji Teraji, 2023. "Behavioural economics of morality and sustainability," Chapters, in: Morris Altman (ed.), Handbook of Research Methods in Behavioural Economics, chapter 20, pages 353-368, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:19806_20
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    Keywords

    Economics and Finance; Research Methods;

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