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Experiments in political psychology

In: A Research Agenda for Experimental Economics

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Listed:
  • Kyle Fischer
  • Quentin D. Atkinson
  • Ananish Chaudhuri

Abstract

This chapter provides an overview of studies that use incentivised experiments to study political ideology. We first look at studies that conceptualise political ideology along a unidimensional liberal-conservative spectrum and explore whether there are behavioural differences between liberals and conservatives. While recent studies find that liberals display more pro-sociality, many other studies find that liberals and conservatives display similar levels of pro-social, ingroup-biased, normative, and punitive behaviour. We then turn to experiments that study two-dimensional political ideology as embodied in the concepts of economic conservatism/progressivism (often measured with the Social Dominance Orientation scale) and social conservatism/progressivism (usually measured with the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale). In such experiments, economic conservatives display lower levels of pro-sociality and universalism and greater tolerance of inequality and tendencies to harm outgroups. Social conservatives tend to display “groupishness†, including distrusting anonymous strangers, cooperating with ingroup members, following rules, punishing in the ultimatum game, and sometimes harming outgroups.

Suggested Citation

  • Kyle Fischer & Quentin D. Atkinson & Ananish Chaudhuri, 2021. "Experiments in political psychology," Chapters, in: Ananish Chaudhuri (ed.), A Research Agenda for Experimental Economics, chapter 8, pages 163-190, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:19403_8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Erik O. Kimbrough & Alexander Vostroknutov, 2016. "Norms Make Preferences Social," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 608-638, June.
    2. Jeffrey Milyo & Jennifer M. Mellor & Lisa Anderson, 2004. "Do Liberals Play Nice? The Effects of Party and Political Ideology in Public Goods and Trust Games," Working Papers 0417, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
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