IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/elg/eechap/17978_16.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

The microeconomics of corruption

In: Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II

Author

Listed:
  • Roberto Burguet
  • Juan-José Ganuza
  • José G Montalvo

Abstract

We review microeconomic research on corruption from the last 30 years. We start by analyzing the seminal models of corruption built on three-tier, delegation models. Then, we go into more detail on the context of corrupt deals, and discuss the main economic factors that affect corruption. We discuss incentives and compensation in bureaucracies, and the interplay of market and bureaucratic structure. Competition and contract design will also be reviewed in relation to procurement under corruptible agents. After reviewing the theoretical contributions, we turn to the empirical evidence. We begin discussing measurement issues, and then move to the analysis of the empirical evidence relative to the theoretical models discussed in previous sections. Finally, we cover several anti-corruption mechanisms proposed in the literature and discuss their relative merits as devices to control or eliminate illegal activities.

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto Burguet & Juan-José Ganuza & José G Montalvo, 2018. "The microeconomics of corruption," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 16, pages 420-450, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:17978_16
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781788112772.00024.xml
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Henke & Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree, 2022. "Honest agents in a corrupt equilibrium," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 762-783, August.
    2. Arozamena, Leandro & Ganuza, Juan-José & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2023. "Renegotiation, discrimination and favoritism in symmetric procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 159(C).
    3. Jiang, Shuguang & Wei, Qian, 2022. "Confucian culture, moral reminder, and soft corruption," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    4. Jiang, Shuguang & Wei, Qian & Zhao, Lei, 2024. "Synergizing anti-corruption strategies: Group monitoring and endogenous crackdown – An experimental investigation," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
    5. Andrew Samuel & Ajit Mishra, 2022. "Does it matter who extorts? Extortion by competent and incompetent enforcers," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 69(3), pages 328-344, July.
    6. He, Haoran & Jiang, Shuguang, 2020. "Partisan culture, identity and corruption: An experiment based on the Chinese Communist Party," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    7. Burguet, Roberto & Iossa, Elisabetta & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2024. "Procurement cartels and the fight against (outsider) bribing," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Economics and Finance;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:17978_16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Darrel McCalla (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.e-elgar.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.