Income distribution as a public task: the redistributive preferences of (mis)informed voters

The distribution of income is paramount in discussions of the res publica. Two normative arguments justify public concern over the distribution of income: one departing from concerns over social welfare, justifying public intervention on grounds of equity; while a second views redistribution of income as the solution to a market failure, justifying such intervention on grounds of efficiency. Although historically redistribution followed from charity, it is unlikely that charity sufficiently redistributes income, as the distribution of income represents a public good. Redistribution following from a democratic system, whereby states intervene in the income distribution through tax-and-transfer systems, brings forth the question of how much states should redistribute. Large national variation in tax-and-transfer systems exists, yet all countries devote a substantial share of tax revenues to income transfers. The main theory explaining variation across countries is critiqued with regard to its empirical success, and two new arguments explaining deviations from theory are introduced, based on the perceptions of voters.