Generalized Darwinism, routines and morality

The chapter engages with Geoff Hodgson’s defense of Generalized Darwinism, namely, the claim that the Darwinian principles of variation, inheritance and selection are necessary, but insufficient, in any analysis of evolving complex systems. This claim is shown to be problematic: Generalized Darwinism is not only insufficient, it is also (sometimes) unnecessary. The argument relies on the distinction between ultimate explanations in terms of natural selection, which explain the distribution of certain patterns of behavior within a population, and proximate explanations, which focus on how the interplay of external and internal factors causes individuals within the population to behave in certain ways. While the two types of explanation can and should mutually inform each other, they are both equally legitimate. Evolutionary explanations are ill-suited to explain certain kinds of human motivation and behavior. To understand morality and routines, non-evolutionary proximate explanations are required.