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Bargaining over sharing total return

In: Joint Venture Strategies

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Abstract

Although they have the potential to create synergies, joint ventures by their nature contain inherent risk. Therefore, each partner in a joint venture needs to incentivize each other in order to maximize their own payoff. Extensive pre-contractual and post-contractual bargaining is essential. This book provides successful bargaining strategies from the point of view of each partner company. Using game theoretical framework to analyze joint venture strategy, it describes practical and legal issues that arise when creating synergies and incentive bargaining in a joint venture. With a particular focus on intellectual property law, including analysis based on many real cases, the book covers issues relating to creating synergies, corporate law issues of conflicts of interest, and antitrust law issues relating to cooperation between independent companies.

Suggested Citation

  • ., 2015. "Bargaining over sharing total return," Chapters, in: Joint Venture Strategies, chapter 4, pages 37-51, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:15785_4
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Jing & Chen, Bintong & Li, Wei, 2018. "Who should be pricing leader in the presence of customer returns?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 265(2), pages 735-747.
    2. Akturk, M. Serkan & Ketzenberg, Michael & Yıldız, Barış, 2021. "Managing consumer returns with technology-enabled countermeasures," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).

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    Keywords

    Economics and Finance; Law - Academic;

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